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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Gregory Oar,
Plaintiff & Appellant,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

,*

vs,
Dale Parks and Sterling Press,
Inc.

Court of Appeals # £3*04..
PRIORITY No-

5

Defendants & Appellees.

On appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah,
The Honorable James S. Sawaya, originally assigned to case;
subsequently the Honorable Tyrone Medley
Prusuant to Rule 29, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Priority of Argument is 5.
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Allen Sims of Allen Sims P.C,
Attorney for Appellees
124 South 600 East
Salt Lake City UT 84102
(801) 533-8505

Gregory H. Oar,
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLANT COURT
This case originated in the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Utah as civil case number 90-0904365PR.
It was originally assigned to the Honorable James S. Sawaya
and subsequently, upon Judge Sawaya1s retirement, to the
Honorable Tyrone Medley.
JURISDICTION: The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this
matter pursuant to Utah Constitition, Article VIII, Section 3(a),
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-2(3) (j) (1978), and Utah Rules of Appeals, 3(a) and 4(a) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
On October 7, 1993 it was submitted to the Superior Court
clerk and was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Honorable James S. Sawaya, judge of the Third District
court, it is asserted made an error in this case.

The error

alleged is stated below:
In a hearing on May 11, 1992 Judge Sawaya ruled that
attorney Allen Sims should be allowed to continue as attorney for
the defendant even though he had represented the plaintiff in
several matters just a few years earlier.

These legal matters

included preparation of many of the very documents which were
presented in this case thereby constituting an extremely flagrant
conflict of interest.
At the same hearing a motion was heard wherein Plaintiff
asked for an accounting of the rental income and expenses from
the property and a check for his share of the net rental income.
Allen Sims stated that there had been no accounting made and
there were no funds to disburse. Allen Sims knew full well that
there was a joint checking account from which the expenses of
owning the property were paid since he himself, for some reason
unknown to the Plaintiff, was issued a check from the account.
In other words Allen Sims lied to Judge Sawaya causing Plaintiff
to lose the property.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is on appeal from the Third District Court's
ruling, made at a hearing on May 11, 1992, that Allen Sims was to
1

remain the attorney of record in this case even though the weight
of evidence indicated that Sims represented Plaintiff/Appellant
Gregory H. Oar on numerous occasions and was not eligible to
represent Parks in this case.
Allen Sims was a member of the firm of Biele, Haslam & Hatch
when Gregory Oar, as president of Sterling Press Inc., engaged
them to do corporate matters along with some personal litigation
for himself.
Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules

of

Professional

Conduct

sets

forth the circumstances under which a lawyer may not represent a
party whose claims are adverse to those of a former client.

That

provision is as follows:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter shall not thereafter; a) represent another
person in the same or a substantially factually related
matter in which that person's interest are materially
adverse to the interest of the former client unless the
former client consents after consultation; or b) use
information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6
would permit with respect to a client or when the
information has become generally know.
There is ample evidence that attorney Allen Sims is well
aware that he was not and is not eligible to represent Dale S.
Parks in any action involving Gregory Oar.

When Plaintiff

/Appellant Gregory H. Oar filed suit in Oar vs.

Parks

involving a

matter where Parks defrauded Oar, Allen Sims apparently advised
Parks to seek other counsel.

Parks then hired Michael N. Zundel

2

of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn to handle that litigation.
In yet another case, which just recently came to light, and
which is still before the court, Oar vs.

Parks

and deMik,

Parks

hired yet another attorney to defend him, L. Benson Mabey.

If

Sims really thought that he was eligible to represent Parks he
certainly would have taken care of these matters in addition to
this current matter before the court.
It has become standard practice for law firms to check all
new client's names against a list, which is usually computerized,
of their clients so that they are alerted when a possible
conflict arises.

This shows the importance that attorneys

generally assign to adhering to Rule 1.9.
of this.

Sims adhered to none

Sims arrogantly states, in his reply to the motion to

disqualify, that he represented the corporation, Sterling Press
Inc., but neither one of the principals, as if the corporation
was someone else.
In yet another case (Oar vs.

Parks),

which has not yet been

filed, involving Parks defrauding Oar of yet another jointly
owned property Parks will undoubtedly hire yet another law firm
to try to defend himself.

It's inconceivable that Sims will risk

further sanctions by taking on this future case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
IMPROPERLY REPRESENTING FORMER PARTNER

3

A)

For some years, beginning in the early 1970's,

Plaintiff/Appellant Gregory H. Oar and Defendant/Respondent Dale
S. Parks were partners in a commercial printing business known as
Sterling Press Inc.

Together we purchased a building at 2630

South 300 East, South Salt Lake City, Utah.

In the early 1980?s

they decided to divide the assets of the business and go their
separate ways.

One major asset which they agreed to keep was

this building in which Oar retained a 42.87% interest and Parks
retained the remaining 57.13%.

Over time Oar had some financial

needs to keep his new venture afloat.

He borrowed $20,000 for 90

days from Barry Birkenshaw for which he gave a quit claim deed on
the property as collateral.

Before the note came due Plaintiff's

business venture failed and he was unable to repay the loan.

Mr.

Birkenshaw recorded the quit claim deed and Plaintiff lost his
interest in the property.

Subsequently, Birkenshaw contacted

Plaintiff's mother, Florence Bowers, and transferred his interest
in the property back to Mrs. Bowers, at a discount, with the intention that Mrs. Bowers would eventually transfer the interest
back to her son, Gregory Oar.
B)

Later, Oar wished to withdraw some funds from the

building in order to engage in other activities.

Through his

mother, Oar offered his portion of the building for sale subject
to his partner's lease agreement, however, when he found a buyer,
Parks frustrated the sale by forbidding the prospective buyer
from even entering the building to inspect it.
4

C)

On August 2, 1990,

Florence Bowers, filed suit in

Third District Court to increase the rent paid on her portion of
the commercial building which was jointly owned by DefendantRespondent Dale S. Parks, or alternately to partition the
building either by sale or a physical partition.

During 1992,

Florence Bowers became ill and finding business decisions very
difficult along with the extreme anxiety over the lawsuit she
transferred the lawsuit over the building to her son Plaintiff/Appellant Gregory H. Oar.
D)

See stipulation (appendix #2).

On or about the 5th of June 1992, Plaintiff

/Appellant Oar filed a motion to disqualify Defendant's attorney
Allen Sims based on the premise that since Allen Sims had been
Oar's attorney when he was president of Sterling Press he was no
longer eligible to represent another party against Oar.
E)

Oar moved the court to disqualify Sims as

defendant's attorney.

A hearing was held.

The court ruled

against Plaintiff Oar.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
PERJURY
A)

On May 12, 1992 the court heard Plaintiff's motion

seeking release of funds held in the Sterling Press building
rental account.
B)

The motion specifically requested a full account-

ing of the rental income and a release of the funds in order to

5

forestall foreclosure scheduled for the following morning.

Allen

Sims knowingly lied to Judge Sawaya when he stated that there was
no accounting and there were no funds to disburse.

Proof of this

became available to Plaintiff on December 10, 1992 when someone
at Sterling Press made a rental payment to the new owner of the
property and included an accounting which included several previous years.

Allen Sims was fully aware of this special checking

account since he himself had received funds from the account with
Gregory Oar's forged signature.
C)

As a result of Allen Sims lying to Judge Sawaya that no

funds were available in the property account, when in fact there
were sufficient funds to redeem the property, and the fact that
plaintiff had insufficient funds to redeem the property, plaintiff lost the property at the foreclosure sale on May 13, 1992.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Attorney Allen Sims was hired and did extensive legal work
for the Plaintiff Gregory H. Oar.
Professional

Conduct

Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules

of

clearly states that this prohibits Sims from

representing Dale S. Parks in any matter involving Gregory Oar.
Therefore, Allen Sims should have been dismissed as the
Defendants' attorney back in July of 1992.
In addition, at a hearing on May 11, 1992, Allen Sims lied
to Judge Sawaya that he had no knowledge that an accounting was
being kept and that there were no funds deposited in a joint

6

property rental account, when in fact he himself had been issued
a check from the account with Gregory Oar's forged signature.
ARGUMENT
Because Judge Sawaya's ruling was contrary to the great
weight of evidence, the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's
motion to disqualify counsel for conflict of interest.

A.

AN ATTORNEY/CLIENT RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN OAR AND SIMS
Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

presupposes the existence of a prior attorney/client relationship
between the challenged attorney and the party who is disputing
the attorney's representation of the adversarial party in the
current litigation.

Thus, the first question to be answered in a

motion to disqualify is whether there was a prior attorney/client
relationship.

Otaka v. Klien

791 P2d 713, 717 (Hawaii 1990) .

Sims initially performed services for Oar in 1981 when
Sterling Press was liquidated.

At that time, Sims negotiated the

terms of the liquidation agreement, and drafted the documents
necessary to effectuate the liquidation.

Where a small, closely

held corporation is involved, and in the absence of a clear
understanding with the corporate owners that the attorney
represents solely the corporation and not their individual
interest, it is improper for the attorney thereafter to represent
a third party whose interest are adverse to those of the

7

stockholders and which arise out of a transaction which the
attorney handled for the corporation.
655, 657 (Or. App.1979).

In Re Brownstin,

602 P.2d

In actuality, the attorney in such a

situation represents the corporate owners in their individual
capacities as well as the corporation unless other arrangements
are clearly made.

Id.

In the matter at hand, Sterling Press had

only two shareholders.

When Sims negotiated and drafted the

liquidation agreement, he was representing not only the
corporation, but also Oar and Parks in their individual
capacities.
Sims was also representing Oar when he negotiated and
drafted the lease for the property, and when he negotiated and
drafted the 1985 agreement.

In Carlson

v. Langdon,

751 P.2d 344

(Wyo. 1988), the Supreme Court of Wyoming interpreted Rule 1.9 of
the Wyoming

Rules

of

Professional

Conduct.

identical to Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules

That Rule is
of

Professional

Conduct.

In that case, the court held that when an attorney does nothing
to indicate or dispel a party's belief that the attorney is
representing his interest, then an attorney/client relationship
exists between the attorney and that party.

Id.

at 347. When

Sims drafted the lease and the 1985 agreement, Oar was under the
impression that Sims was representing his interests.

Sims did

nothing to dispel Oar's belief that he was representing him in
the negotiation and drafting of these documents. As such, an

8

attorney/client relationship existed between Sims and Oar with
regard to those agreements as well.
The fact that Oar may not have paid Sims for all of the work
which he performed would not control the question of whether an
attorney/client relationship existed between Sims and Oar with
regard to those agreements as well*
The fact that Oar may not have paid Sims for all of the work
which he performed should not control the question of whether an
attorney/client relationship does not require the payment of a
fee or formal retainer but may be implied from the conduct of the
parties.

Matter

of McGlothlen,

663 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Wash. 1983).

Payment may be an important consideration, but it is not
essential to the existence of an attorney/client relationship,
especially for purposes of apply Rule 1.9.

Carlson

v.

Langdon,

supra.
Because Oar was one of only two stockholders in Sterling
Press, and because Sims represented Sterling Press, Sims also
represented Oar with regard to the liquidation agreement.

In

addition, an attorney/client relationship also existed between
Sims and Oar with regard to the lease and the 1985 agreement
because Sims did nothing to dispel Oar's notion that he was
representing his interest in those matters. An attorney/client
relationship is thus presumed to have existed between Sims and
Oar.

9

B. THE MATTERS INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION ARE SUBSTANTIALLY
FACTUALLY RELATED TO THE MATTERS IN WHICH SIMS REPRESENTED OAR
Once it has been established that an attorney/client
relationship existed between the challenged lawyer and the party
who is disputing the attorney's representation of an adversarial
party in the current litigation, the court must determine whether
the matters are substantially factually related.

The court must

determine whether in the factual context the matters involving
the two clients are related in some substantial way.
Langdon,

supra.

Carlson

v.

If the two matters have common facts, the

attorney in a position to receive confidential information which
possibly could be used to the detriment of the former client in a
later proceeding.

Id.

In the matter at hand, Sims' prior representation of Oar is
substantially factually related to the matters being litigated in
this action.

In proving the allegations made in his Complaint,

Oar must refer to the circumstances surrounding the negotiation
and signing of the liquidation agreement, the lease, and the 1985
agreement.

Sims represented Oar with regard to the drafting and

the signing of all of those documents.

In his representation,

Sims became privy to confidential information which he could use
to Oar's detriment in this matter.

In fact, Sims has already

used provisions of the 1985 agreement to support his argument
opposing Oar's Motion for Release of funds.

10

Oar's recovery in this matter is predicated upon proving the
facts related to the liquidation agreement, the lease, and the
1985 agreement.

Sims representations are substantially factually

related, and Rule 1.9 prohibits Sims from representing parties
with adverse interest to Oar in this matter.
Regarding Plaintiff's Charge of Perjury against Allen Sims
the record speaks for itself.
CONCLUSION
Under the Code of

Professional

Ethics

Rule 1.9 it is clear

that Allen Sims should have been disqualified as counsel for Dale
S. Parks and Sterling Press Inc.
In addition, Allen Sims knowingly lied to Judge Sawaya when
he stated that there was no accounting and there were no funds in
the property rental account.

The funds that existed could have

prevented Appellant from losing his interest in the property in
foreclosure.
Therefore, Appellant Gregory H. Oar prays the court;
1)

Order that the matter be remanded to the Third District

Court for retrial but barring Allen Sims from representing Dale
S. Parks and Sterling Press Inc.
2)

Or alternately, that Defendant Dale S. Parks be ordered

to pay Appellant Gregory H. Oar the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars
($50,000) for his loses as a result of Attorney Allen Sims
actions.

11

3)

Plus any other relief that the court deems appropriate,

DATED this 23rd day of November 1993.

Gregory H. Oar
Appellant acting Pro Se
APPENDIX
1.

Attached herewith is a copy of Rule 1.9, Conflict of Interest:

Former Client, from Utah Court

Rules

Annotated,

Rules of

Professional Conduct, pp. 972-3.
2.

Stipulation substituting Oar for Bowers as plaintiff.
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K u l e 1.9

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

ent, he is peculiarly susceptible to the charge
that he unduly influenced or overreached the
client If a client voluntarily offers to make a
gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept the
gift, but before doing so, he should urge that
the client secure disinterested advice from an
independent, competent person who is cognizant of all the circumstances. Other than in
exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an instrument in which his client desires to name him beneficially be prepared by
another lawyer selected by the client/'
Paragraph (d) is substantially similar to DR
5-104(B), but refers to "literary or media"
rights, a more generally inclusive term than
"publication" rights.

972

Paragraph (e)(1) is similar to DR 5103(B),
but eliminates the requirement that "the client
remains ultimately liable for such expenses."
Paragraph (e)(2) has no counterpart in the
Code.
Paragraph (f) is substantially identical to
DR 5-107(A)(l).
Paragraph (g) is substantially identical to
DR 5-106.
The first clause of paragraph <h) is similar to
DR 6-102(A). There was no counterpart in the
Code to the second clause of paragraph (h).
Paragraph (i) has no counterpart in the
Code.
Paragraph (j) is substantially identical to DR
5-103(A).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Attorney's assertion of retaining
lien as violation of ethical code or rules governing professional conduct, 69 A.L.R.4th 974.

What items of client's property or funds are
not subject to attorney's retaining lien, 70
A.L.R.4th 827.

Rule 1.9. Conflict of Interest: Former Client.
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially factually
related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to
the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after
consultation; or
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage
of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a
client or when the information has become generally known.
COMMENT
After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer may not represent another client except in conformity with this Rule. The
principles in Rule 1.7 determine whether the
interests of the present and former client are
adverse Thus, a lawyer could not properly
seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So
also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused
person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the
government concerning the same transaction.
The scope of a "matter" for purposes of Rule
1.9(a) may depend on the facts of a particular
situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved
in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse
interests clearly is prohibited. On the other
hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type
of problem for a former client is not precluded
from later representing another client in a
wholly distinct problem of that type even
though the subsequent representation involves
a position adverse to the prior client. Similar
considerations can apply to the reassignment

Appendix Page 1

of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdiction. The underlying question is whether
the lawyer was so involved in the matter that
the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in
question.
Information acquired by the lawyer in the
course of representing a client may not subsequently be used by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude
the lawyer from using generally known information about the client when later representing another client.
Disqualification from subsequent representation is for the protection of clients and can be
waived by them. A waiver is effective only if
there is disclosure of the circumstances, including the lawyer's intended role in behalf of the
new client.
With regard to an opposing party's raising a
question of conflict of interest, see Comment to
Rule 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a
firm with which a lawyer is associated, see
Rule 1.10.

173

R U i E S OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

R u l e 1 10

CODE COMPARISON
There was no counteipait to paiagraphs (a)
fcnd (b) in the Disciplmaiy Rules of the Code
[The piubleni addiessed in paragraph (a) was
sometimes dealt with undei the lubric of
fcanon 9 ol tht Code which provided 4. law
wer should avoid e s t n the appeal ance of impro
Iriety EC 4 6 stated that the obligation of a
lawyu to preserve the confidences and secrets
tfhis client continues aftei the teimination of
Ins emplo)inent
I The pioMsion in paiagiaph (a) foi waiver by
Rhe foimci client is similar to DR 5 105iC)

Ihe exception in the last sentence of paia
graph (b) peimits a lawyei to use infoimation
ielating to a former client that is in the public
domain a use that was not prohibited by the
Code which protected only confidences and
secrets Since the scope of paiagiaph (a) is
much broader than confidences and seciets
it is necessary under the Rules to define when
a lawyer ma> make use of infoimation about a
client aftei the client lawyei relationship has
terminated

Rule 1.10. Imputed Disqualification: General Rule.
(a) While lawyei b aie abbociated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
repie&ent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be piohibited
fiom doing bo by Rule 1 7, 1 8(c) 1 9 or 2 2
(b) When a lawyei becomes associated with a fum, the fnm may not know
mgly lepiesent a peison in the same or a substantially factually ielated mat
tei in which that lawyei, or a fum with which the lawyer has associated, had
previously tepiesented a client whose interests aie materially adverse to that
peison and about whom the lawyer had acquired information piotected by
Rules 1 6 and 1 9(b) that is mateiial to the mattei
(c) When a lawyei hab teiminated an association with a firm, the fum is
not pi ohibited fi om thei eafter representing a pei son with mtei ests matei lally
adverse to those of a client repiesented by the formerly associated lawyer
unless
(1) The mattei is the same or substantially related to that in which the
foimetly associated lawyei lepiesented the client, and
(2) Any lawyei remaining in the firm has information piotected by
Rules 1 6 and 1 9(b) that is material to the mattei
(d) A disqualification prescubed by this Rule may be waived by the affected
client under the conditions stated in Rule 1 7
COMMENT
Definition

ot

Firm

For pui poses of the Rules of Professional
Conduct the term firm includes lawyers in a
private firm and lawyers employed in the legal
department of a corporation or other organiza
tion oi in a legal services organization
Whether two oi more lawyers constitute a firm
within this definition can depend on the spe
cific facts bor example two practitioners who
share ofilce space and occasionally consult or
assist each other ordinarily would not be re
garded as constituting a fum However, if they
present themselves to the public in a way sug
gesting that they are a firm or conduct them
selves as a firm they should be regarded as a
firm for purposes of the Rules The terms of
any formal agreement between associated law
yers are relevant in determining whether they
are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual
access to confidential information concerning
the clients they serve furthermore, it is rele
vant in doubtful cases to consider the underly
mg purpose of the rule that is involved A
group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm
for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer
should not represent opposing parties in litiga
tion while it might not be so regarded for pur

poses of the rule that infoimation acquued b>
one lawyer is attributed to another
With respect to the law depaitment of an
organization there is ordinal ily no question
that the members of the department constitute
a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Pro
fessional Conduct However there can be un
certainty as to the identity of the client ror
example it may not be clear whether the law
department of a corporation represents a sub
sidiary or an affiliated coiporation as well as
the corpoiation by wtueh the members, ot the
department are directly employed A similar
question can arise concerning an unincoipo
rated association and its local affiliates
Similar questions can also arise with respect
to lawyers in legal aid Lawyers employed in
the same unit of a legal service organization
constitute a firm but not necessai ily those em
ployed tn separate units As in in** case of inde
pendent practitioners, whether the lawyers
should be treated as associated with each other
can depend on the particular rule that is in
volved and on the specific facts of the situation
Where the lawyer has joined a p n v a t e firm
after having represented the government the
situation is governed by Rule 1 11(a) and (b),
where a lawyer represents the government af
ter having served private clients the situation
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MICHAEL L. CHIDESTER #5263
MOONEY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
236 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-5635
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
FLORENCE BOWERS,
STIPULATION
Plaintiff,
vs.

DALE S. PARKS, STERLING PRESS,
INC., a Utah corporation, WEST
ONE BANK, a Utah corporation,
RICHARD G. NEWTON, and BRUCE
M. GIFFEN,

Civil No. 900904365 PR

Defendants.

Judge James S. Sawaya
—oooOooo—

Defendants, Dale S. Parks and Sterling Press, Inc., by and through their attorney of
record, Allen Sims, hereby stipulate and agree that the Court may substitute Gregory Oar as
plaintiff for Florence Bowers in the above-entitled matter.
DATED this /f-

day ofifcseh, 1992.

ALLEN SIMS
Attorney for Defendant
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